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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

No. 377

RONNING MACHINERY COMPANY and
THE GALION IRON WORKS AND
MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Petitioners and Appellants Below,

vs.

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.,
Respondent and Appellee Below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

HARKER H. HITTSON,
c/o The Jeffrey Mfg. Co.,
Columbus, Ohio,
Counsel for Petitioner.

INDEX.

	PAGE
Petition for Writ of Certiorari	1
Summary statement of the matter involved	2
Reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ	3
Brief in support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari	6
The opinions of courts below	6
Jurisdiction	6
Statement of the case	7
Specification of Errors	7
Argument (summary)	9
Complete Argument	15

Cases Cited.

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern, 210 U. S. 405	10
DeForest Radio v. General Elec. 283 U. S. 664	7
Ex parte Derby, 1884 C. D. 21	27
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated, 220 U. S. 428	14
Emery et al. v. Cavanagh, 17 Fed. 242	27
Galion v. Adams, 105 Fed. (2d) 943	3, 9, 10, 16
Galion v. Adams, 128 Fed. (2d) 411	3, 9, 15
Galion v. Beckwith, 25 Fed. Supp. 73	10, 18
Ide v. Trorlicht, 115 Fed. 137	27
James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356	27

Jockmus v. Gale, 295 Fed. 208 27

Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580 14

Milcor Steel Co. v. Fuller, et al., U. S. Supp. Ct. No. 720, April 27, 1942 10

Myers et al. v. Austin-Western Road Mach. Co., 45 Fed. (2d) 751 ..... 13, 17, 20, 25

National Biscuit Co. v. Crown Baking Co., 105 Fed. (2d) 422 28

Remington v. National, 6 Fed. (2d) 585 27

Robinson on Patents, Sec. 360, p. 515 28

Ronning Machinery Co. v. Winsor, 76 Fed. (2d) 392 ..... 12, 17

Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U. S. 47 7

Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U. S. 249.... 28

Star Mfg. Co. v. Crescent Forge & Shovel Co., 179 Fed. 856 28

Walker on Patents, Deller Edition, p. 372 27

Westinghouse v. Formica, 266 U. S. 342 10

Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 53 U. S. P. Q. 478—U. S. Supp. Ct. No. 332, May 25, 1942 ..... 10, 13, 15

STATUTES CITED.

Judicial Code Sec. 240 (a) (28 U. S. C. 347) 6

R. S. 4886 (U. S. C. Title 35, Sec. 31) 4, 26

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your petitioners respectfully show:

I.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE MATTER INVOLVED.

This action was originally filed and tried in the United States District Court, Southern District of Illinois, Northern Division, Honorable J. Leroy Adair, presiding, at Peoria, Illinois.

The action was brought by petitioner, Ronning Machinery Co., for infringement by respondent of four of its patents, numbered Reissue 19,846; 1,658,353; 1,660,050 and 1,883,403; and by petitioner, The Galion Iron Works and Manufacturing Company (hereafter called Galion), for infringement by respondent of two of its patents, being Winsor patent No. 2,020,271 and Arndt patent No. 2,147,631 (R. 2-22). Each of said patents relates to a road grader.

The trial was without a jury, and judgment was rendered for respondent as to all patents (R. 62; 2222-6).

This petition only involves the Winsor patent No. 2,020,271, (R. 2298), consequently it alone will be discussed hereinafter in detail.

As to said Winsor patent No. 2,020,271 petitioners relied upon claims 2, **3**, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, **10**, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, **28**, 29, 30 and **31** (R. 16) and alleged them to be infringed by respondent's Auto Patrols and Motor Graders (Pl's. Exh. 546; R. 1539 and 1541-3).

The District Court held the Winsor patent not infringed and while apparently considering it valid, rendered judgment for respondent (38 Fed. Supp. 783; R. 53-62; 2225-6).

On appeal from the judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, also held said patent not infringed and, in addition, held it invalid. 129 Fed. (2d) 70 (R. 3061).

A petition for rehearing was filed as to both the questions of validity and infringement of the Winsor patent as well as to two of the other patents involved, and it was denied (R. 3071).

II.

REASONS RELIED ON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT.

1. The decision of said Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as to infringement is in conflict with its own decisions on the **same patent** in the case of *Galion* v. *Adams,* 105 F. (2d) 943 (First Suit) and the case of *Galion* v. *Adams,* 128 F. (2d) 411 (Second Suit); and its decision as to validity is in conflict with its own decision on the **same invention** (the Winsor patent had not then issued) in the case of *Myers et al.* v. *Austin-Western Road Machinery Co.,* 45 Fed. (2d) 751.

2. The decision of said Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, as to infringement, by holding the Winsor patent infringed by, or as covering, the Adams graders in the case of *Galion* v. *Adams,* 105 Fed. (2d) 943 (First case), followed by its decision in the second case of *Galion* v. *Adams,* 128 Fed. (2d) 411 that the Adams and Caterpillar graders were of the same design and construction, together with its decision in the case on petition that said Winsor patent was not infringed by the Caterpillar graders, raises the question as to whether on the issue of infringement a patent is to be construed in one manner against a licensee (Adams) and in a different manner against one not a licensee (Caterpillar), which is an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

3. The decision of said Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as to both infringement and validity, by holding the Winsor patent not infringed and invalid, so far departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctions such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

4. The defendant, Caterpillar Tractor Co. is the only large manufacturer of road graders in the United States that is not a licensee under the Winsor patent, consequently there is little chance to receive any other decision on this patent in any other circuit, as a consequence of which a conflict in decisions of different Circuit Courts of Appeals is unlikely.

5. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals as to validity of the Winsor patent by holding it invalid as involving no invention over the Oswald 1919 machine and the Russell 1920 machine, involves an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court; or said decision in this respect so far departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision. Said Court of Appeals treated each of the two mentioned devices as **prior inventions** and held Winsor's device, though admittedly quite different, did not **involve invention** over them. In fact, Winsor is a prior inventor as to said devices. They are only valid as 2 year statutory bars under Revised Statutes, section 4886 (U. S. C. title 35, Sec. 31), and as such should have been limited as forfeitures against Winsor of exactly what they disclosed. A prior invention may, under proper conditions, be reorganized in the light of common knowledge to show lack of invention in a later machine, but a dedication, abandonment, or statutory bar, as to which

one is a prior inventor, is not on the same basis under said Sec. 4886 but is limited in its effect to substantially exactly what it discloses.

Wherefore, your petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue under the seal of this Court, directed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, commanding said court to certify and send to this Court a full and complete transcript of the record and the proceedings of said Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had in the case numbered and entitled on its docket, No. 7732, *Ronning Machinery Co. et al., Plaintiff-Appellant,* v. *Caterpillar Tractor Co., Defendant-Appellee,* to the end that this cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court as provided for by the statutes of the United States; and that the judgment herein of said Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit be reversed by the Court, and for such further relief as to this Court may seem proper.

Dated August 28, 1942.

RONNING MACHINERY CO., ET AL.,

By: HARKER H. HITTSON,
Counsel for Petitioner.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RONNING MACHINERY COMPANY and
THE GALION IRON WORKS AND
MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Petitioners and Appellants Below,

vs.

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.,
Respondent and Appellee Below.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

The Opinions of Courts Below.

The Opinion in the District Court (R. 53-62) is reported in 38 Fed. Supp. 783, that of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (R. 3065) is reported in 129 Fed. (2d) 70.

JURISDICTION.

1. The date of the judgment to be reviewed is May 27, 1942, petition for rehearing denied July 16, 1942 (R. 3071).

2. The statutory provision which is believed to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court is Judicial Code Sec. 240 (a) (28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 347).

3. The facts which show the nature of the case and the rulings below are such as to bring the case within the jurisdictional provisions relied upon, have already been stated in the preceding petition under I (pp. 2-6), which are hereby adopted and made a part of this brief.

4. The cases believed to sustain said jurisdiction are as follows:

Schriber-Schroth Co. v. *Cleveland Trust Co.*, 305 U. S. 47.

De Forest Radio v. *General Electric*, 283 U. S. 664.

III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This has already been stated in the preceding petition under I (pp. 2-3), which is hereby adopted and made a part of this brief.

IV.

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS.

1. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in holding the Winsor patent not infringed by the Caterpillar Auto Patrol and Motor Graders.

2. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in holding the Winsor patent invalid because devoid of invention; and specifically while in effect conceding that Winsor produced a **new combination** of old elements which produced a more efficient machine than **any** prior art machine and one capable of performing a wide range of operations totally incapable of performance by any prior art machine, in holding this **new combination** of old elements was lacking in invention.

3. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in not determining the question of infringement by comparing the Winsor patent claims with the accused devices and erred in determining infringement by comparing the accused devices with the specific disclosure of the Winsor patent specification.

4. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in treating the Oswald 1919 and the Russell 1920 Machines public use machines as prior art and in not limiting their effect to statutory abandonments, since Winsor was a prior inventor as to each of them.

V.

ARGUMENT.

Summary of Argument.

Point A. Nobody, even including respondent's expert, or his attorney, or either the District Court or the Court of Appeals below, has set forth in any manner how the claims of the Winsor patent fail to read on respondent's accused machines. Petitioners assert with confidence that respondent will not even attempt to point out wherein claims 3, 10, 16, 26, 28 and 31 of the Winsor patent contain any limitations not found in respondent's machines.

Point B. When the Winsor patent was before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of *Galion* v. *Adams,* 105 F. (2) 943, 947 (First Case) it held the Winsor patent claims read clearly and plainly on the **Adams** graders Models 50, 51 and 20. In the second case of *Galion* v. *Adams,* 128 F. (2d) 411, 412, 413, the **same** court held the Caterpillar Auto Patrol and the **Adams** graders (including the above mentioned models as well as others) to be substantially of the same design and construction. Still we find this **same** court in its decision as to which this petition is filed, affirming the District Court and holding the Winsor patent not infringed by the said Caterpillar Auto Patrol.

Point C. The only basis upon which there could possibly be valid rulings that the Winsor patent covers the Adams graders and not the Caterpillar Auto Patrol (the two being of substantially the same design and construction) is that infringement or scope of a patent is determined by one rule against a licensee (Adams) and by another rule against one not a licensee (Caterpillar). No ruling on this exact question by this Court is known, yet

that in the case of *Westinghouse* v. *Formica,* 266 U. S. 342, as well as sound reason, refutes such a proposition. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, itself recognized there should be no such distinction in the first *Galion* v. *Adams* case, 105 Fed. (2d) 943, for it stated, P. 947:

> "The claims in plain and unambiguous language cover many different kinds of structures, including models 50, 51 and 20. If the claims are so broad that they cover the prior art, they are invalid, and the court in such case should not attempt to limit them in order to save them."

Following this the decision criticized that of the District Court in the case of *Galion* v. *Beckwith,* 25 F. Supp. 73 and said, p. 947-8:

> "We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in the *Galion* case as to the power of either the court or the patentee to limit an unambiguous claim by the specification."

Apparently, in the case on petition, said Court of Appeals ignored its own prior recognition of the fact that patent claims should be construed against a licensee and a stranger alike. The rule on **validity** is different.

Point D. In affirming the ruling of the District Court that defendant's accused machines did not infringe the Winsor patent, the Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings and sanctions such a departure by the District Court. This Court has many times ruled that infringement is to be determined by comparing the patent **claims,** not the specific description of the patent specification, with the accused devices.

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. *Eastern,* 210 U. S. 405, 418, 419.

The Williams Mfg. Co. v. *United Shoe Machinery Corp.,* U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 332, May 25, 1942.

Milcor Steel Co. v. *Fuller et al.,* U. S. Supp. Ct. No. 720, April 27, 1942.

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals **completely ignored** the patent claims in determining the question of infringement and improperly based their rulings on the specific disclosure of the patent specification description and, in important particulars, entirely misconstrued parts of it.

Point E. (1) The District Court stated that Winsor had made an invention in connecting a tractor at the rear end of a grader to push it, rather than putting it ahead to pull it (38 Fed. Supp. 783, 785). The experts of the Patent Office, in allowing the Winsor patent after extensive prosecution, including two interferences in both of which Winsor was awarded priority over his rivals, had previously ruled Winsor had made an invention.

(2) The presumption of validity attached to the Winsor patent was supported by the strongest evidence to support such a presumption, including the following facts which were ignored by the Court of Appeals.

a. The prior art failed to disclose a single teaching of a power operated blade type road grader with a unitary tractor or power traction unit **at the rear end,** pushing the grader.

b. A grader as defined in (a) above in which the important **3 point connection** was provided between the tractor or power traction unit and the frame, so that distortion of the grader frame under the influence of the grader blade would not be transferred to the tractor or power traction unit to break it, or misalign bearings.

c. The Russell 1920 power operated blade graders (R. 1685 and 2163) that combined a tractor and grader to make a power operated blade grader put the tractor **ahead** of the grader where it had many disadvantages as compared with the Winsor structure. (It was valid only as a 2 year statutory bar).

d. The Russell Grader Co., predecessor to Caterpillar in the road grader business, in making power operated road graders first, about 1920 (R. 67-8; Pls. Exh. F, R. 1685), used a two wheel **unstable tractor** at the **front** in place of the front wheels of the grader; later, about 1923 it used a **four wheel stable** tractor at the **front** (R. 64-5; Pls. Exh. G, R. 1687) and then, in 1924, literally and actually copied the structure previously introduced through Winsor's personal efforts and those of the Wehr and Hadfield-Penfield companies with which Winsor was successively associated. Winsor first reduced to practice in June 1919, his first commercial machine was June 1922. *Ronning Machinery Co.* v. *Winsor,* 76 Fed. (2d) 392.

e. The principal power operated grader relied upon by respondent to show lack of invention, namely the Oswald two year public use, did not combine a tractor and grader but put a motor above the grader blade on the grader frame. **8** or **9** such machines were sold during the history of these machines against **30,000** Winsor type machines. No Oswald type machine has been manufactured for many years (R. 299, 694). (It was also only valid as a 2 year statutory bar).

f. For a number of years respondent paid royalties, totaling in excess of $75,000 under Ronning patent No. 1,706,256 and when Winsor was successful in an interference against Ronning, 76 Fed. (2d) 392, and took from Ronning Winsor's claims 2 to 10, inclusive, and the Winsor patent issued, respondent cancelled its license under the Ronning patent because of the issuance of said claims in said Winsor patent (R. 19-20; 36-37).

g. There is not a single prior art grader which will perform all of the operations Winsor's type of grader will perform (See R. 1595-1609; 1287-1311).

h. Today **all** the large manufacturers of graders are manufacturing Winsor's type power graders to the exclusion of all other types (R. 122-3).

i. All of the large manufacturers of power operated graders have taken a license under the Winsor patent, save respondent, said licensees including Huber Mfg. Co.; Western-Austin Co.; J. D. Adams Co.; Allis-Chalmers Co.; W. A. Riddell Co. and petitioner Galion (R. 411-12; 1653-9).

(3) In holding the Winsor patent invalid the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ignored the above important facts and rendered an opinion in direct conflict with its prior opinion in the case of *Myers et al.* v. *Austin-Western Road Machinery,* 45 Fed. (2d) 751. There it held such remote devices as tractors with attachments, and agricultural devices were "not in the same inventive field" (Decision page 753) as the Winsor power operated road grader there involved. In the instant case the inconsistent basis upon which said court's holding of invalidity is founded is that since the **individual elements** of Winsor's combination are old, such as tractors, pull type road graders, and three point suspensions in automobiles, they may be combined without invention because a somewhat similar combination is found in agricultural devices; but even they lack a three point suspension, or a **grader blade,** or any other tool which presents the same or equivalent problems presented by a grader blade.

(4) In holding Winsor had failed to make an invention, said Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings because:

(a) It clearly lacked any anticipating prior art.

(b) It ignored the established rule of law that a **new combination** of old elements which performs a new function and produces a new result involves invention.

The Williams Mfg. Co. v. *United Shoe Machinery Co., U. S. Supp. Ct.* No. 332, May 25, 1942.

(c) It ignored the well established rule that to justify a holding that claims of a patent are invalid over prior art it is essential to find the exact combination of the patent or its full equivalent in the prior art where substantially the same means perform substantially the same result.

Loom Co. v. *Higgins,* 105 U. S. 580;

Diamond Rubber Co. v. *Consolidated,* 220 U. S. 428.

Point F. As above set forth, except for respondent, all of the large manufacturers of power operated road graders have taken a license under the Winsor patent, consequently unless the decision of said Court of Appeals is reviewed and reversed Winsor and those supporting him will probably have no other chance to litigate his patent. Winsor is a poor man, dependent on income from this patent (R. 302, 349). This independent inventor made his reduction to practice in 1919 on a farm in Northern Michigan entirely without aid from any corporation and without financial assistance (R. 267, 275). Later (1922) a small company, the Wehr Company, first commercially produced his invention under Winsor's supervision. Until shortly before his patent issued **none** of the large manufacturers paid any attention to his **rights.** They **all** paid considerable attention to his invention (R. 548-9). Unless the decision of said Court of Appeals is reversed **the solemn promise of the United States Government** made when his patent was granted, will be a nullity and Winsor will fall a victim of that growing conviction among independent inventors that a large corporation willing to spend limitless money can successfully appropriate almost **any invention** and those who champion the rights of inventors and spend money to support **that which the government promised them** would be better advised to join the ranks of the appropriators, even though the

prior art lacks any true teaching of the thing patented, and invention, as measured by true tests recently again approved in the case of *The Williams Mfg. Co.* v. *United Shoe Machinery Corp.,* U. S. Supp. Ct. No. 332, May 25, 1942, be present.

Point G. A prior use, operating only as a statutory bar under R. S. 4886, and not showing prior invention, is not on the same footing as a prior invention and properly should be limited to essentially the exact thing which it discloses or embodies.

COMPLETE ARGUMENT.

Petitioners shall only elaborate, when necessary, to support the Summary of Argument and will do so under headings there used.

Point A. For a brief description of the Winsor patent, respondent's Auto Patrol and Motor Graders and the Adams Motor Graders, respondent adopts the language of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of *Galion* v. *Adams,* 128 F. (2d) 411 (Second case) p. 413.

> "Both the Caterpillar products held not to infringe and defendant's (Adams) graders are power operated machines with a relatively long vehicle frame comprised of spaced, elongated, symmetrically arranged side members and cross members, with a power traction unit at the rear and a steering unit at or near the front end of the frame. Each has a grader blade adjustably mounted on the frame to operate on material along the path of travel. Each has a mechanism between the side members and the power unit to hold the implement in a fixed relation to the frame, independent of the steering wheel unit. In both the engine

is supported at three spaced points upon the frame. Each has the operator's station between the engine and the grader blade, except that in a few models of defendant's graders it is located over and to the rear of the motor. And both place their engines over the axle except in a few models of defendant. These slight differences are of no importance."

Petitioners also respectfully direct attention to Chart A showing these several machines, and containing claims 3, 10, 16, 28 and 31 of the Winsor patent.

What limitation in **any** of these claims fails to find response in the Caterpillar graders? **None** is set forth by either court below. **None** is lacking.

Point B. Having ruled directly in said second case of *Galion* v. *Adams* that the Adams and Caterpillar machines were the same, **as obviously they are.** (For record illustrations of these several machines see, Caterpillar machines R. 1539, 1541, 2073: Adams R. 1277-83; Winsor R. 1269; 1311; 2298); no explanation is given, or is possible to reconcile the holdings of both the District Court and said Court of Appeals that these claims do not cover the Caterpillar graders, with the holding of said Court of Appeals in the **first** *Galion* v. *Adams* case, 105 Fed. (2d) 943, 946-948, wherein said Court of Appeals stated:

"The question here presented is whether any of appellant's last three models (50, 51 and 20) embody one or more claims of the Winsor patent No. 2,020,271.

However, it is obvious that one or more of the claims involved reads literally upon each of the models here in question. Appellant seeks to parry the force of this situation by having the court limit the claims by the language of the specification to a means for coupling a tractor in a road grader in such a manner that the tractor may be detached from the

CATERPILLAR MOTOR GRADER

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT 574



ADAMS MOTOR GRADER No. 50

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT 525



THE CLAIMS IN PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE COVER MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF STRUCTURES, INCLUDING ADAMS MOTOR GRADER No. 50. GALION V. ADAMS—105F 2d 943, 947.

Claims of the Winsor Patent sued upon—2, 22, 23, 24, 26,

3. The combination with a tractor, of a frame secured to and extending forwardly from the tractor, a wheeled support for the forward end of the frame, a grader blade adjustably carried by the frame rearwardly of the support, an operator's station, and controls extending from said wheeled support and from said grader blade to within reach of the operator at said station.

10. The combination with a tractor, of a frame attached to the tractor and extending in front thereof, a steering wheel unit applied to and supporting the front portion of said extended frame, a road grading tool connected to said frame and working at the rear of said steering wheel unit but ahead of said power unit, and controls, extending to within reach of the tractor operator, for raising, lowering and angularly adjusting said road grading tool, and for steering said steering wheel unit.

16. The combination with power traction mechanism comprising a rear axle housing and ground engaging traction devices operatively connected through said housing to an internal combustion engine, of a frame mounted on said traction devices and extending forwardly in advance thereof, a steering wheel unit at the front portion of said extended frame, a road working implement connected to said frame and adapted to work at the rear of said steering wheel unit, a supporting connection between said internal combustion engine and said frame, means for controlling said road working implement, and means for operating said steering wheel unit both during the operation of said power traction mechanism.

28. In a power road grading machine, the combination with a relatively long vehicle frame comprising spaced-apart side members continuously longitudinal from the front end of the machine to the rear end thereof, of a power plant

HART A

3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31.

engine from an ordinary tractor of standard type of construction connected to said frame, ground engaging traction devices connected to said power plant engine to be driven thereby, a supporting connection between said engine and said frame side members, a steering wheel unit for one end of said frame, an elongated grader blade adjustably suspended from said spaced-apart side members between said steering wheel unit and said traction devices to occupy a diagonally extending position transversely of said side members and spaced below the same at the road surface, an operator's station, and means for controlling the operation of the grader blade and the operation of the steering wheel unit.

31. In a power operated road machine, the combination with a relatively long vehicle frame comprising spaced-apart elongated symmetrically arranged side members, of a power traction unit at one end portion of said frame and comprising an engine connected by power transmission mechanism to ground engaging devices, a steering wheel unit at the other end portion of said frame, a road working implement adjustably mounted on said frame in position to operate on material along the path of travel of the machine, mechanism between the said spaced-apart side members and the forward central portion of said power traction unit to hold the latter in fixed relation to said frame independently of said steering wheel unit, the power traction unit being otherwise supported solely by said ground engaging traction devices, spaced-apart supporting connections between the said spaced side members and said ground engaging traction devices to afford support of said frame solely by said traction devices and said steering wheel unit and provide connections at three spaced points between the frame and the power traction unit, an operator's station, and means operable from said operator's station for adjusting the working implement and actuating said steering wheel unit during movement of the machine along the roadway by means of said traction unit.

CATERPILLAR AUTO PATROL

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT 571



"The gasoline engines used in the No. 11 and No. 10 Auto Patrols are the same successful design as those used in 'Caterpillar' Gasoline tractors." (Pls.' Exh. 195, p. 21, R. Vol. 2, p. 1237.)

"The engine and transmission form a sturdy compact unit mounted in a three point suspension in the grader frame."
(Pls.' Exh. 573, ~~Brief-Appendix.~~)

FIGURE 1 OF WINSOR PATENT 2,020,271



grader and restored to its original uses. If this contention is sound, the next contention is that the claims as thus limited do not read upon appellant's structures, because they are unitary in character, and the tractors used therein may not be detached from the grader and used as a truck. We do not question the court's power to interpret ambiguous language of claims, but we do not understand that the court has the power by judicial decree to limit any claim that is not ambiguous, merely because there is an inconsistency between it and the specification. Here the claims in plain and unambiguous language cover many different kinds of structures, including models 50, 51 and 20. If the claims are so broad that they cover the prior art, they are invalid, and the court in such case should not attempt to limit them in order to save them. That question, as before stated, is not in issue and we cannot approve the District court's findings that they are valid.

In the *Galion* case, *supra*, (*Galion* v. *Beckwith*, 25 Fed. Supp. 73) no license was involved and the court was at liberty to hold either that the claims were invalid or that they were not infringed. It concluded that it was unnecessary to pass on the validity of the claims, and concluded to limit them to what it regarded as a precise disclosure of the specifications. It then found there was no infringement and cited our ruling in the case *Myers* v. *Austin-Western Road Machinery Company*, 7 Cir., 45 F. (2d) 751. We express no opinion here as to the claims thus limited. We merely hold that the claims as they stand are infringed by each of appellant's structures here in issue, citing claim 16 as typical. We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in the *Galion* case as to the power of either the court or the patentee to limit an unambiguous claim by the specification.

Furthermore, we indicate no opinion as to whether any of the claims are too broad. Such a holding would

render the claims invalid and that issue is not before us. We merely hold that the claims as they stand are unambiguous and that they cover the accused devices."

How can the public know what the rule as to interpretation of patent claims is, if such conflicting decisions are rendered by a United States Court of Appeals, unless rectified?

Point C. Elaboration of this point is deemed unnecessary. Its logic is basic.

Point D. It is a significant fact that neither the District Court in its decision nor said Court of Appeals discusses **any claim,** or any limitation in any **claim** of the Winsor patent and neither decision points out any limitation in any claim that finds no response in respondent's machines. A clearer case of a departure, by both said courts, of the long established and recognized procedure to be applied to determine infringement could scarcely be found. Parts of the decision of the District Court, apparently sanctioned by said Court of Appeals, are unusually flagrant. For example, the District Court in its Finding of Fact No. 7 (R. 2223, 38 Fed. Supp. 783, 788) held:

> "The only novelty residing in the plaintiff's patent rests in the means for coupling any of the well-known Tractors with an ordinary road-working machine, and thus supplying the motive power to operate the road machine, and **still have the tractor for use for other purposes when it is not utilized as a road machine.**" (Emphasis added).

The **history** of this finding is interesting. It was **not** proposed by respondent **in this case.** It was **originally** finding No. 10 made in the case of *Galion* v. *Beckwith,* 25 F. Supp. 73 (R. 2025). Being aware of this **clearly erroneous** find-

ing in said *Beckwith* case, respondent's expert was examined directly with respect to it **and admitted** there was no teaching in the Winsor patent that the **tractor** could be removed for other uses (R. 986-7).

Point E. (1) The Winsor file history (Pls. Exh. 530; R. 1321-1515) reveals one of the most startling instances of continuous, varied and burdensome obstacles ever put in the path of an inventor seeking a patent. It shows Winsor was required to go through two protracted and expensive interferences, first with Myers and then with Ronning, consuming about 7 years' time, and obviously great expense. Winsor won both interferences (R. 1374, 1451, 1468). *Ronning Machinery Co.* v. *Winsor,* 76 Fed. (2d) 392. In connection with a case bearing similar facts this Court stated:

> "A patent regularly issued, and even more obviously a patent issued after a hearing of all the rival claimants, is presumed to be valid until the presumption has been overcome by convincing evidence of error. The force of that presumption has found varying expression in this and other courts * * * through all the verbal variances, however, there runs this common core of thought and truth, that one otherwise an infringer who assails the validity of a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance. *Radio Corporation* v. *Radio Engineering,* 293 U. S. 1, 7, 8."

(2) (a) In holding Winsor made no invention said Court of Appeals had no basic patent or prior art machine showing the equivalent of Winsor's combination including a tractor or power traction unit at the rear end of a blade grader. Without attempting to analyze each prior art device relied upon it will suffice for this petition merely to point out the following with respect to the prior art relied upon by said Court of Appeals.

Moats 581,606, April 27, 1897 (R. 2358-66). This is merely an extremely old drawn type grader without any kind of motive power.

Godley 899,215, Sept. 22, 1908 (R. 2456-60). This is an agricultural device. Here the weight of the harrow alone is used. Nothing holds the harrow **down.** In a Winsor power grader, **great weight** is added to the big scraper blade to **hold it down.** The **tractor** at the rear is a source of much of this weight. Also the **angular position** of the grader blade relative to the line of travel places a great **side thrust** on the frame which must be, and is, resisted by the tractor. Nothing like this exists in Godley. Also, in a Winsor power blade grader, the blade tends to lift the front wheels and cause loss of steering which is also resisted by weight of the tractor. Godley has no such problem. The Court of Appeals was therefore **right** in the case of *Myers* v. *Austin-Western,* 45 Fed. (2d) 751, when it ruled agricultural devices in a different inventive field. Obviously it cannot do any road grading work. No Winsor claim reads on it. The harrow cannot be adjusted from the operator's station, nor can opposite ends thereof be independently adjusted.

Dawson 982,480, Jan. 24, 1911 (R. 2462-4). This patent is in the same category as Godley. Besides, the front steering wheel, the patchwork main frame, and the plow suspensions are totally inoperative (R. 1117-19). This is truly **a nightmare on paper.** The **practical history** of this device is a vacuum.

Ronning 1,340,461, May 18, 1920 (R. 2762-2805). The remarks above made with respect to Godley fully apply.

Oswald's 1919 machine (R. 1988-89). This is probably the closest machine (Winsor was a prior inventor but this device is a bar **for what it shows** because of

2 years' prior public use). It has no tractor or power traction unit at the rear. The motor is on the grader frame directly **above** the blade where (a) its adjustability is very limited and (b) it cannot be seen by the operator. The different types of work it can do are much more limited than those performed by Winsor machines. For example, by reference to Pls' Exh. 575 (R. 1595-1609) which illustrates numerous typical operations performed by Winsor type machines, the Oswald machine cannot do "Ditching" (R. 1597, 708), or "Road Mix" (R. 1603, 1092-3), or "Snow Removal" (R. 1601, 1091). That is probably why only 8 or 9 of them were ever sold (R. 694) and some **30,000** Winsor type machines have been sold (R. 299). Why doesn't respondent make Oswald type and not Winsor type machines?

Fossum 1,235,456, July 31, 1917 (R. 2612-20). This is not a **blade** type grader. This inventor condemns the **blade** grader (R. 2619, lines 72-80) and then illustrates another nightmare on paper that the **grader industry never heard of** in a practical sense. **None** was ever sold, so far as the record discloses. It can't do "Ditching" (R. 1597); "Road Mix" (R. 1603); "Snow Removal" (R. 1601) or even "Light construction" (R. 1607). There is no mechanism to hold the endless cutter **down** (R. 1046) and all of the deficiencies of Dawson's agricultural devices, above set forth, apply to this structure.

(2) (b) The three point suspension between the tractor or power traction unit and the grader is totally lacking in any equivalent prior art. The purpose of this feature is emphasized by respondent in advertising its Auto Patrol (R. 2073-4). Briefly they are, as follows:

The large blade of a grader does very heavy work at times and is held down by the combined weight of the

tractor unit and the grader frame. This blade in doing heavy work often strikes stones, roots or hard spots and produces stresses, strains and twisting of the grader frame. To prevent these being transmitted to the tractor, whose parts are largely castings and where shafts and bearings are aligned to close tolerances, is the function of the three point connection. The record establishes that in the early days the Western-Austin Company brought out a grader of the Winsor type **without** the three point connection as shown in Beatty patent No. 1,537,328 (R. 2932-48) and that it was a failure because lacking this feature and was abandoned (R. 293-5; 364-6). Lacking this important teaching **in the grader art,** or even in agricultural implements, the Circuit Court lifts it from the entirely remote **automobile art** in the Ruemelin patent 894,-060, July 21, 1908 (R. 2440-47) where it is found purely as an incidental feature and wherein **nothing** equivalent to a grader blade is present. To **combine** in the Court's mind, such patents which were never combined in practice, as a basis for overruling the presumption of validity attached to Winsor patent, is certainly a departure from recognized practice which requires correction.

(2) (c) The Russell 1920 grader is the **only** combined tractor-blade grader unit of record. It is a 2 year statutory bar for what it shows (R. 2163).

This machine represents what the Caterpillar engineers considered the way to combine a tractor and grader to make a power operated grader in 1920. (Caterpillar took over the Russell company in 1928, R. 64-5). Instead of showing lack of inventive imagination and genius in Winsor, this is the strongest evidence of Winsor's inventive genius that could be produced. It is not only significant that the Russell company engineers considered this to be the way to **combine** a grader and tractor to provide

a power operated grader in 1920, but Galion's engineers did the same thing about the same time (R. 1649; 379-81). Here the tractor is substituted for the **front wheels** of the pull type grader.

When this machine didn't work satisfactorily, was it obvious to the Russell and Galion engineers to put the tractor at the rear? No it was not, they **both** then tried a four wheel tractor **at the front.** (See Pls.' Exh. G, R. 1687; 64-5; R. 409-11 and R. 1533; 380-1).

After the Winsor machine came on the market, being introduced by **two new companies,** the Wehr Company and then the Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co. (R. 548-9; 355-57), and the established road grader manufacturers were losing business to them, it **was then obvious** that Winsor's construction was the best one, so Caterpillar's predecessor and Galion, as well as the rest of the large grader manufacturers, copied the Winsor design and abandoned all others, including this Russell 1920 type (R. 381).

The advantages of the Winsor type over this Russell 1920 type may be summarized as follows:

In the Winsor type,

(1) the weight of the tractor holds down the rear end of the grader so that considerable weight can be applied to the blade or moldboard to force it into the ground. The weight also aids in steering and holds the rear end against lateral thrust by the diagonal blade (R. 582-3).

(2) Since in this type of machine the traction wheels are ahead of the grader blade, said traction wheels travel on rough, and sometimes soft muddy ground, while in the Winsor type machine the wheels travel over ground which has been smoothed off and prepared into a level surface by the blade ahead of them (R. 129).

(3) It is almost impossible to back up such a machine because there is essentially a one point connection between the grader and tractor and consequently the machine will buckle if attempt is made to reverse it (R. 380-1).

(4) Steering is very hard and the machine is poorly balanced because to steer it the whole tractor must be turned relative to the grader, while in Winsor machines the front wheels are steered like an automobile.

(5) The long controls from the tractor unit to the rear of the grader are very unsatisfactory and when the grader travels over rough ground they bind or operate improperly (R. 380).

Considering the functions of such a machine as compared with Winsor type machines, it is useless for "Ditching" (R. 1597); "Snow Removal" (R. 1601); "Towing" (R. 1605) or even "Light Construction" (R. 1607).

These Russell 1920 type machines are useful only for light maintenance and possibly finishing work. All heavy digging and grading is beyond their capacity.

(2) (d) The record shows that the practical power operated road grader dates from Winsor's introduction of his grader to the industry in 1922 after his earlier reduction to practice in 1919 (R. 549, 431-53). When Winsor's machine was first introduced the road grader fraternity did not think well of it and generally treated it as a joke (R. 362-4; 409-11; 381). At that time the Russell 1920 type was considered by the skilled engineers to be the best and this was followed by a similar machine using a four wheel tractor at the front in place of a two wheel tractor (R. 64-5; 380-1).

(2) (e) to (i) Nothing need be added to the Summary under these headings.

3. In the case of *Myers et al.* v. *Austin-Western,* 45 Fed. (2d) 751, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, had before it the question of infringement of Austin-Western graders which the court stated was the Winsor grader "with immaterial differences" p. 752. (For an illustration of this grader see R. 1255-57). Myers was claiming infringement of his patents Nos. 1,399,570 (R. 2832) and 1,466,098 (R. 2908) on tractors with attachments and a power driven agricultural device. Said Court of Appeals held the Winsor road grader not to be "in the same inventive field" (Decision pp. 753 and 755) and this is correct, yet in the case under petition said Court of Appeals resorts to the remote agricultural devices of Godley, Dawson and Ronning 1,340,461 for a teaching of a tractor at the **rear end** of a grader. Only in such remote art, is a tractor found so positioned, **and then without** the important three point connection.

4. The summary need not be enlarged.

Point F. During the years that Winsor struggled through successive interferences, appeals, petitions, etc., in the Patent Office the **grader industry generally ignored his rights.** Winsor received no royalty, except $5.00 a grader from the Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co., his original licensee, and its successor, the W. A. Riddell Company. The large manufacturers had, since about 1924, deliberately copied his machines, but Winsor was involved in interference with Ronning, so why should anyone worry about him until he defeated Ronning?

Shortly before the Winsor patent issued, Galion paid $50,000.00 cash for an exclusive license under it to the receiver for the W. A. Riddell Company (R. 772, 776) and an agreement was made with Mr. Winsor to pay him

$10.00 a grader. This was the first act by an established strong manufacturer to recognize Winsor's rights. When the Winsor patent issued, licenses were offered to all the established road grader manufacturers, including respondent (R. 1779-80) and most of them, including all of the larger ones, except respondent, took a license (R. 1653-9).

If the judgment of the Court of Appeals is not reversed, Winsor's promised source of income from his invention will cease (R. 349).

Point G. It is an important fact that the only two power operated blade graders relied upon by the Court of Appeals, namely the Oswald 1919 machine (R. 1988-89) and the Russell 1920 device (R. 2163) are not truly prior art, yet in its decision the said Court improperly made no distinction between them and true prior art but remote devices. The Russell 1920 device was **directly** relied upon and **reconstructed** in the Court's mind to show **lack of invention** (R. 3069) 129 Fed. (2d) 70, p. 72, Petitioner is aware of no decision of this Court which settles this important question.

Section 4886, R. S. (U. S. C. title 35, Sec. 31) may properly be segregated into two parts. The first part is the general grant which provides that:

> "Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, etc.,—not known or used by others in this country before his invention or discovery thereof * * * may, * * * obtain a patent therefor".

If this was all the statute provided, Oswald's October 1919 public use or publication (being subsequent to Winsor's established reduction to practice in June of 1919) and the Russell 1920 one man grader would have **no effect** and be unavailable against Winsor.

However, the general grant of said statute is restricted in that any device "in public use or on sale in this country more than two years prior to his application" (since reduced to one year) bars a patent on such device. In short, such a public use or sale acts as a dedication or forfeiture of **that device** insofar as it incorporates any part of the thing sought to be patented. It is a restriction on the general grant of a right to a patent. As such a restriction or dedication, it must be strictly construed and limited to the precise thing embodied in the public use. In the instant case it means that Winsor is entitled to **no claims** in his patent which read on Oswald or Russell and he obviously has none. Beyond that, Oswald and Russell have no limiting effect on Winsor, yet they were strongly relied upon by the Court of Appeals in a much broader respect, namely, to show **lack of invention** in Winsor as though they were truly prior art patents. *Ex parte Derby,* 1884, C. D. 21, and cases cited; *Emery, et al.* v. *Cavanagh,* 17 Fed. 242; *Jockmus* v. *Gale,* 295 Fed. 208; *Ide* v. *Trorlicht,* 115 Fed. 137; *Remington* v. *National,* 6 F. (2d) 585, 612; Walker on Patents, Deller Edition, pages 372, 3, Section 99, and cases cited.

As stated by this Court in *James* v. *Campbell,* 104 U. S. 356, 379:

> "The **same combination** of postmarker and blotter in one instrument was also exhibited in Norton's own patent of Aug. 9, 1859. As he did not then reserve the process of stamping letters with such an instrument, nor the combination of a post-marker and a blotter, and did not make any simultaneous application therefor, he could not afterwards obtain a patent for such process and combination, but would be restricted to such particular combination or process as might be exhibited in a new device or apparatus."

As stated in Robinson on Patents, Sec. 360, p. 515:

> "The public use or sale of an invention works an abandonment only of the exact invention used or sold", citing numerous authorities.

In the leading case of *Smith and Griggs Mfg. Co.* v. *Sprague,* 123 U. S. 249, 265-6, this Court stated:

> "The patentee unduly neglected and delayed to make his application for the patents, and deprived himself of his right thereto by the public use of the machine in question, so far as it is embodied in the claims under discussion".

Other claims, not reading on the public use, were held valid.

See also *Star Mfg. Co.* v. *Crescent Forge & Shovel Co., et al.,* 179 Fed. 856 (C. C. A. 7).

That a public use bars only claims which read on it, and not improvements, is recognized in the case of *National Biscuit Co.* v. *Crown Baking Co.,* 105 Fed. (2d) 422, 427 (C. C. A. 1) wherein the Court stated:

> "All that has been shown on the favorable view of the evidence is that the 1920 machine was not operatively perfect. This is immaterial as regards claims 1, 6, 15, 19, 26, 36, 39, 46, 61 and 83, which read upon the 1920 machine and are not limited to any addition or improvement."

Other claims of the patent, not reading on said public use, were held valid.

Respectfully submitted,

HARKER H. HITTSON,
Counsel for Petitioners.

August 28, 1942.



Office - Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
OCT 5 1942
CHARLES ELMORE CROPLEY
CLERK

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1942

No. 377

RONNING MACHINERY COMPANY and the GALION IRON WORKS AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Petitioners and Appellants Below,

vs.

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.,

Respondent and Appellee Below.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

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Subject Index

	Page
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented	2
Statement of the Case	4
Brief Comment on the Reasons Relied on by Petitioners in Seeking the Writ	8
Point A	10
Point B	12
Point C	12
Point D	13
Point E	14
Point F	15
Point G	16
Conclusion	17

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases

	Pages
American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U. S. 1, 6	14
Benoit v. Wadley, 54 Fed. (2d) 1041, 1047 (CCA 7)	14
Charleston, S. C., Min. & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 273 U. S. 220, 223	9
Davison v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 22 Fed. Supp. 461, 467	17
Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 105 Fed. (2d) 943 (CCA 7)	12
Galion Iron Works & Mfg, Co. v. Adams, 128 Fed. (2d) 411 (CCA 7)	12
Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Beckwith, 25 Fed. Supp. 73	5, 10
Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Beckwith, 105 Fed. (2d) 941 (CCA 3)	6, 11
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175, 178, 179	9
Jones v. Sykes Metal Lath & Roofing Co., 254 Fed. 91, 94 (CCA 6)	17
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301, 312	8
Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U. S. 211, 217	14
Simmons v. Hansen, 117 Fed. (2d) 49, 52 (CCA 8)	17
Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U. S. 508, 509	9
Stilz v. United States, 269 U. S. 144, 147	8
United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 227	9
United States v. Societe Anonyme, etc., Cail, 224 U. S. 309, 322	8

Statutes

Judicial Code, Section 240 (2) (28 U.S.C. 347)	2
Revised Statutes 4886 (35 U.S.C. 31)	16, 17

In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States

October Term, 1942

No. 377

Ronning Machinery Company and the Galion Iron Works and Manufacturing Company,
Petitioners and Appellants Below,
vs.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
Respondent and Appellee Below.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois appears at page 53 of the record and is reported in 38 Fed. Supp. 783. The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appears at page 3065 of the record and is reported in 129 Fed. (2d) 70.

JURISDICTION.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Sec. 240 (a) of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat. 938; 28 U.S.C. 347).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

Petitioners having failed in their duty of setting forth in their petition and brief the precise question or questions presented, such duty is cast upon respondent. Furthermore, even a cursory review of the petitioners' brief will reveal that no questions of law are raised, but that the petition is but an attempt to have this Court review merely *questions of fact that have been decided adversely against petitioners by two separate District Courts and by two different Circuit Courts of Appeals.*

This is an ordinary patent suit involving no unusual features, no conflict of decision between Circuit Courts of Appeals, nor any new or unusual questions of law. On the contrary, there is complete unanimity of decision between two Circuit Courts of Appeals as shall be hereinafter pointed out.

The sole questions presented by the petition and brief are:

(1) Whether certiorari will be granted to review *concurrent findings of fact* by the Illinois District Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that respondent's accused machines did not infringe the Winsor patent, the only patent referred to in the petition, particularly where, as here, *identical* findings of fact with respect to the *same* machines had theretofore been made by the District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania and approved by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in an infringement suit involving the *same* patent.

(2) Whether certiorari will be granted to review the findings of fact of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to the effect that the Winsor patent lacks invention and is invalid, when in so doing that Circuit Court of Appeals violated no established rule of law, but merely followed the law as expressed in numerous cases by this as well as other Courts.

The petitioners contend that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding against them on the question of infringement, because of said Court's alleged failure to compare the claims of the Winsor patent with the accused devices. They also contend that such Court erred in deciding that the combination of elements of the Winsor patent was void for lack of invention.

Respondent disputes all of these contentions. The question of infringement of the Winsor patent was argued before the Illinois District Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as before the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and each of those Courts found the facts to be contrary to petitioners' contentions herein and resolved them in favor of respondent.[1] The question of invention in the

[1]It should be noted that *Galion* is the only real petitioner herein, the same Galion as brought the suit in Pittsburgh. The Ronning Machinery Company is included only because in the case below other patents were sued on, not being included in the petition.

Winsor patent was thoroughly argued and presented to the Illinois District Court and to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals below, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided contrary to petitioners' contentions herein and resolved them in favor of respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Petitioners' summary statement of the matter involved is such that it needs correcting and supplementing.

On April 7, 1923, the application for Winsor patent No. 2,020,271 was filed, the application being entitled "Tractors and *Attachments Therefor*".[2] This application remained pending in the Patent Office more than *twelve years,* being issued on November 5, 1935.[3]

In 1930, respondent, Caterpillar Tractor Co. (hereinafter called Caterpillar), commenced the design of its Auto Patrol, one of the machines accused of infringing the Winsor patent herein, and this machine appeared on the market commencing in 1931.[4]

Approximately *four years after* respondent's Auto Patrol had been on the market and *twelve years after* the application for the Winsor patent had been filed, and in July and September, 1935, the application was amended and most of the claims sued on herein were inserted in the application for the first time.[5] At the same time the

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[2]R. Vol. II, p. 1321.
All italics herein may be deemed respondent's.
[3]R. Vol. IV, p. 2298.
[4]R. Vol. I, p. 560.
[5]R. Vol. II, pp. 1469 to 1483, 1499 to 1502.

title of the application was changed from "Tractors and Attachments Therefor" to "Road Working Machine"[6] and the patent allowed to issue.

Immediately following its issuance and on November 21, 1935, the Galion Iron Works and Manufacturing Company (hereinafter called Galion), one of the petitioners herein, notified Caterpillar of the alleged infringement thereof.[7] Upon receipt of this letter, negotiations were had between Galion and Caterpillar in an endeavor to arrive at a settlement of the controversy, and in July, 1936, the parties being unable to compromise their difficulties, the settlement negotiations were concluded.[8]

Thereafter, in August, 1936, Galion brought a suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Beckwith Machinery Company,[9] a distributor for Caterpillar, because of the sale by Beckwith of the Caterpillar Auto Patrol,[10] *the identical machine accused of infringement herein.* The defense of this suit was immediately undertaken by Caterpillar.[11]

In April of 1938, the Pittsburgh case was tried before Honorable F. P. Schoonmaker, District Judge, resulting in a decision in favor of the defendant, the trial Court holding that the Caterpillar Auto Patrol was not an infringement of the Winsor patent.[12] The trial Court at

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[6]R. Vol. II, p. 1469.
[7]R. Vol. II, p. 1223.
[8]R. Vol. II, pp. 781 to 783; Defendant's Exhibit 117, R. Vol. III, p. 1781.
[9]R. Vol. III, p. 2086, hereinafter referred to as the Pittsburgh suit.
[10]R. Vol. III, p. 2083.
[11]R. Vol. II, p. 784.
[12]*Galion Iron Works and Mfg. Company v. Beckwith Machinery Co.*, 25 Fed. Supp. 73.

Pittsburgh also rendered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,[13] many of which are identical with the facts as found by the District Court herein,[14] and entered a decree dismissing the Bill of Complaint.[15]

The District Court in the Pittsburgh suit found it unnecessary to pass on the validity of the Winsor patent in view of its decision on the question of infringement.

Following this decision and decree, Galion took an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That Court approved the findings of the District Court and rendered its opinion affirming the District Court's adjudication of non-infringement.[16]

Following this decision and in an endeavor to relitigate the identical issues adjudicated adversely to it in the Pittsburgh suit and on November 24, 1939, Galion instituted this action against respondent, wherein it was again contended that respondent's road graders, known and designated as Auto Patrols and Motor Graders, infringed the Winsor patent. The complaint was amended several times, and on March 3, 1941, after a protracted hearing of many days' duration during which time numerous witnesses testified and vast numbers of exhibits were introduced, the Illinois trial Court entered its judgment whereby the complaint herein was dismissed.[17]

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[13]R. Vol. III, pp. 2024-2025.
[14]See Findings 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 herein, R. Vol. III, pp. 2222-2223.
[15]R. Vol. III, p. 2023.
[16]*Galion v. Beckwith*, 105 Fed. (2d) 941.
[17]R. Vol. III, p. 2225.

Prior to the entry of the judgment as above set forth, the trial Court rendered a written opinion[18] and made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.[19]

The trial Court found, as had the previous District Court in Pittsburgh and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, that the accused Auto Patrols and Motor Graders did not infringe the Winsor patent herein for the reasons set forth in its opinion and in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The trial Court did not deem it necessary to pass on the validity of the Winsor patent, although its findings clearly indicate the trial Court's belief in the lack of validity thereof.[20]

From the judgment dismissing the complaint, petitioners took their appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.[21] Following a full and complete hearing, the Circuit Court of Appeals, after reviewing the facts, held the Winsor patent to be void for lack of invention[22] and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. In addition, the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the trial Court, the District Court in Pittsburgh and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that the accused machines herein were not an infringement of the Winsor patent.

Thereafter a petition for rehearing was filed, which was denied without comment on July 16, 1942.[23]

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[18]R. Vol. I, p. 53.
[19]R. Vol. III, p. 2222.
[20]R. Vol. III, p. 2223.
[21]R. Vol. III, p. 2228.
[22]R. Vol. IV, p. 3065.
[23]R. Vol. IV, p. 3072.

BRIEF COMMENT ON THE REASONS RELIED ON BY PETITIONERS IN SEEKING THE WRIT.

Preliminarily, it should be noted from the facts heretofore set forth that there is no conflict of decision between any Circuit Courts of Appeals on the same matter, but on the contrary, the only two Circuit Courts of Appeals that have had an opportunity to pass on the same questions involving the same patent and the same accused machines *are in complete accord and agreement* on the question of lack of infringement. This petition, therefore, is but an attempt to obtain a further review of a usual suit for the infringement of a patent decided adversely to petitioners in two Circuit Courts of Appeals.

In addition we have herein two District Courts, rendering substantially identical fact findings with respect to a controversy involving an identical patent and an identical accused machine. Thus, eight judges have concurred without a dissent, in the finding that the accused machines herein are not an infringement of the Winsor patent.

That the ascertainment and declaration of lack of identity between an accused machine and the alleged invention of a patent, or in other words, non-infringement is a fact finding as distinguished from a conclusion of law, is so well settled as to hardly require citation of authorities. However, a few of the authorities so holding are set out below.[24]

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[24] *United States v. Societe Anonyme, etc., Cail*, 224 U.S. 309, 322;
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 301, 312;
Stilz v. United States, 269 U.S. 144, 147.

This Court, under a long established rule, has declared that it will accept the concurrent findings of the Courts below, except in a case of clearest error,[25] and it is well settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is not to review disputed and controverted fact questions which have been decided.[26] *A fortiori* should this be true where, as here, the very fact findings under attack have been concurred in by two other lower Courts.

This in and of itself should be a clear answer to the petition herein. However, for sake of completeness we shall answer the main reasons asserted by petitioners for the granting of their petition. In so doing, however, we will not attempt to analyze the evidence or point out the many erroneous statements with regard thereto that appear in petitioners' brief, believing that such a discussion is of no aid to this Court in a consideration of the question now before it.

The reasons relied on by petitioners in seeking the writ herein are apparently those under the heading "Argument",[27] and listed as Points A to G, inclusive. They can be readily divided into two groups, namely Points A to D, directed to the alleged error of the Courts below in holding the Winsor patent not infringed, and Points E to G, directed to the alleged error of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in holding the Winsor patent invalid.

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[25] *Charleston, S. C. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. United States*, 273 U.S. 220, 223, and the many cases cited therein.

[26] *General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.*, 304 U.S. 175, 178, 179;
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227;
Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U.S. 508, 509.

[27] Petition and Brief, p. 9.

For their first reason, designated Point A, petitioners contend that neither the lower Courts, respondent nor respondent's expert has set forth the manner in which the accused machines differed from the Winsor patent.[28] In this the petitioners are in error.

Respondent has earnestly and vigorously asserted throughout all of this litigation from the Pittsburgh case to the final argument of this cause that not one of the claims of the Winsor patent, when properly construed, reads on the accused machines. In its briefs and arguments before the District Court in Pittsburgh, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the trial Court herein and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, respondent pointed out in detail the manner in which the accused machines differed from any combination of parts found in the Winsor patent. And each of those Courts agreed with respondent.

A very substantial part of the testimony by respondent's expert was directed to that very subject matter and he gave testimony at some length pointing out the manner in which the claims of the Winsor patent failed to read on the accused machines, which testimony was, of course, the very foundation for respondent's arguments.

The opinion of the District Court judge in the Pittsburgh suit[29] discusses and analyzes the Winsor patent most thoroughly, quotes claim 31 thereof and in some detail points out the manner in which the accused machines differ therefrom.

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[28]Petition and Brief, pp. 9, 15 and 16.
[29]25 Fed. Supp. 73.

Likewise the opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals[30] quotes claim 31 and with careful analysis sets forth the reasons why there is no infringement.

In addition, in the opinion of the District Court herein[31] is found statements setting forth the limitations in the claims of the Winsor patent which preclude a finding of infringement. The findings of fact herein also expressly set forth the limitations in the Winsor claims which petitioners choose to ignore.[32]

Thus we have three reported decisions, each one of which does what petitioners say it does not, and each of the three opinions referred to is in accord. Obviously under these circumstances, and in view of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision herein on the question of invalidity, it was manifestly unnecessary for that Court to burden already overburdened published reports by repeating what had been said thrice before. Therefore, in connection with the question of infringement, that Court adopted the reasoning of the three prior decisions and said:

> "If we were wrong in our conclusion as to invalidity, in view of the prior art, we would be compelled to restrict the patents to the specific constructions mentioned in the respective claims, and, in that case, to agree with the District Court that, under such construction, the devices complained of are not within the scope of the claims sued upon, as pointed out by the trial court and by both the District Court and the

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[30]105 Fed. (2d) 941.
[31]R. Vol. I, p. 53.
[32]R. Vol. III, pp. 2222-2223.

Court of Appeals in *Galion v. Beckwith,* 25 Fed. Supp. 73 and 105 Fed. (2d) 941" (citing cases).[33]

From the foregoing it is apparent that there is no foundation in fact for petitioners' erroneous assumption presented under Point A, and it is entirely devoid of merit.

As their second and third points, designated Points B and C,[34] petitioners attempt to find some alleged conflict or inconsistency in the *Seventh Circuit,* between the instant case and two other cases.[35] That there is no conflict of decision or inconsistency will become at once apparent when it is realized that the parties, issues, evidence and facts in those cases were entirely different from the case at bar. Obviously each case must be decided on its own facts and on the evidence before the Court in each case. The Adams cases could not be decided on the evidence in this case, nor could this case be decided on the evidence in the Adams cases.

The first Adams case[36] was a suit *not* for the infringement of a patent, but a *suit to recover royalties due under a license contract,* Adams being a licensee under the Winsor patent. In that case the Court, correctly or otherwise, did not determine the scope to be given the Winsor patent in infringement litigation, but merely held that the Adams machines were within the scope of the Winsor claims *literally construed.* In the instant case the lower Court

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[33]R. Vol. IV, p. 3070.
[34]Petition and Brief, pp. 9, 10 and 16 to 18.
[35]*Galion v. Adams,* 105 Fed. (2d) 943 and 128 Fed. (2d) 411.
[36]105 Fed. (2d) 943.

correctly construed and read the Winsor claims in connection with the specification and drawings.

The Adams cases and the instant case involved entirely different questions and were decided on entirely different records. There is no conflict between the decisions in those cases as would require this Court to undertake the review of the case at bar.

As their fourth point, Point D,[37] petitioners allege that in holding the accused machines not infringed, the lower Court ignored the claims of the Winsor patent, misconstrued the patent and "departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings". This point is so closely related to Point A that we will not repeat what we there said.

Petitioners' contention with respect to the lower Courts' adjudication of non-infringement under this Point as well as Point A is predicted upon the erroneous assumption that in finding non-infringement, the lower Courts disregarded the language of the claims in suit. The contention mistakenly asserts that those Courts completely ignored the claims and compared the accused machines with the specific description and the illustrations found in the specifications. This assumption is entirely unfounded.

What each of the four lower Courts did, and correctly so, was to refer to the specifications and drawings of the patent to ascertain the meaning of the claims. Having referred to the specification and drawings each of the four lower Courts rightly concluded that the combination of parts as defined in the Winsor claims was not found in the

[37]Petition and Brief, pp. 10, 18 and 19.

accused machines. Abundant authority not only supports but requires such interpretation of patent claims.[38]

Likewise, petitioners' assertion that the lower Courts "departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings" is not supported by the record. Petitioners' main contention in this regard is somewhat obscure, but a reading of the decisions of the four lower Courts will disclose that, quite contrary to any departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings, each of the lower Courts followed a long list of judicial precedents in arriving at eminently sound and correct conclusions.

Point D therefore, like Points A, B and C, is without merit and does not warrant a review of this cause by this Court.

The next reason advanced by petitioners, Point E,[39] relates to that portion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision which held the Winsor patent invalid for lack of invention. Little comment need be made on this alleged error, because, as a reading of the well considered opinion of the Court below will demonstrate, in holding the Winsor patent invalid the lower Court followed well settled rules of law, not only as announced by this Honorable Court, but also as expressed by numerous other Circuit Courts of Appeals.[40] The analysis of the prior art is fully and sufficiently discussed in the Court's opinion.

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[38] *American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co.*, 283 U.S. 1, 6;
Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217;
Benoit v. Wadley, 54 Fed. (2d) 1041, 1044 (C.C.A. 7).

[39] Petition and Brief, pp. 11 to 14 and 19 to 25.

[40] R. Vol. IV, pp. 3068, 3069, 3070.

Each of the points and arguments advanced in support of this alleged error was strenuously and thoroughly urged by petitioners in the Court below, not only in the final argument but in the briefs and in the Petition for Rehearing, and each thereof was carefully considered by the lower Court and rejected.

Petitioners' complaint would seem to be that because the lower Court did not specifically comment on each of the contentions urged by them, they were ignored, but obviously it is not necessary nor practicable for a Court in deciding a cause to discuss each and every contention advanced by a party, nor to point out its fallacy or lack of pertinency.

The next reason advanced by petitioners is Point F.[41] The reasoning upon which this point is based is rather hidden, but it would seem that petitioners are here contending that this Court should undertake to review this case because if it is not reversed, Mr. Winsor, the patentee, will not receive any further income from his patent.[42]

Included in the argument on this point is the statement to the effect that unless the decision below is reviewed and reversed, Winsor (it should be petitioner Galion, the owner of the Winsor patent) will have no other opportunity to litigate his patent. This statement is based on the half truth that, except for respondent, all of the *large* road grader manufacturers have taken a license under the Winsor patent. The fallacy of this contention is apparent. This statement admits that there are road grader manu-

[41]Petition and Brief, pp. 14, 15 and 25, 26.
[42]Petition and Brief, p. 26.

facturers who are not licensees of Galion even though not "large", and it could litigate this patent with them if it so desired.

The last point, *urged for the first time in this litigation by petitioners* on the question of invention, is Point G.[43] This argument is based upon the erroneous conclusion that a prior public use under R.S. 4886 (35 U.S.C. 31) cannot be used to show lack of invention, and petitioners contend that the lower Court improperly used two prior public uses, namely the Russell and Oswald machines, each of which had been in public use for more than two years before Winsor filed his application.

A complete answer to this contention is that these two prior uses were but a small and not necessarily the most important part of the prior art relied on by the Court below in arriving at its conclusion. Indeed, as is apparent from the lower Court's decision,[44] it found the Winsor patent did not achieve invention over the prior *patented* art offered in evidence, and referred to in the opinion below, quite apart from and independent of the Russell and Oswald prior uses. So that even if we assume, contrary to the fact, that the lower Court was in error in its use of said prior public uses, that fact avails petitioners nothing here.

Furthermore petitioners, in order to support their contention that the Russell and Oswald prior uses were employed improperly by the lower Court, necessarily *assume* that the Winsor invention date was 1919.[45] The vast

[43]Petition and Brief, pp. 15, and 26 to 28.
[44]R. Vol. IV, pp. 3066, 3067, 3068; 129 Fed. (2d) 70, 71, 72, 73.
[45]Petition and Brief, p. 26.

amount of evidence disproving this date, the fact that in the Third Circuit litigation Winsor was restricted to his filing date for his date of invention,[46] all indicates that petitioners' assumption is wrong and that the lower Court properly included the Russell and Oswald machines in the prior art as a basis for determining lack of invention.

That the lower Court did not err in its use of the Russell and Oswald prior public uses, however, would seem to be most obvious. It is axiomatic in the patent law that in determining whether or not a patent rises to the dignity of invention, the *entire* prior art, consisting of patents, publications and prior public uses must be taken into consideration. Prior public uses are part of the prior art[47] by virtue of the very provisions of R.S. 4886 (35 U.S.C. 31).

None of the authorities cited by petitioners supports the fallacious contention urged by them and no one of them disputes the fundamental rule expressed above and this point is utterly devoid of merit.

CONCLUSION.

In the foregoing comments, we have endeavored to be as brief as possible and have omitted to respond to that portion of the petition and brief relating to controversial fact matters, already decided by the Courts below, such

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[46]R. Vol. III, p. 2025.

[47]*Davison v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co.*, 22 Fed. Supp. 461, 467;
Simmons v. Hansen, 117 Fed. (2d) 49, 52 (C.C.A. 8);
Jones v. Sykes Metal Lath & Roofing Co., 254 Fed. 91, 94 (C.C. A. 6).

as a discussion of the prior art;[48] and of the application of the claims of the Winsor patent to the accused and Adams graders;[49] and to such immaterial subjects as Winsor's financial condition, either in the past or in the future,[50] believing that a consideration or discussion of those fact questions would not assist the Court in determining the questions before it.

The decisions below are correct. They are in accord with the applicable decisions of this Court, and are not in conflict with the decisions of any other Circuit Court of Appeals.

The questions presented involve the application of well settled and long established rules of law to the facts peculiar to this case, are not of general importance and are not worthy of review in this Court.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Dated, San Francisco, California,
September 28, 1942.

CHAS. M. FRYER,
Counsel for Respondent.

ALFRED C. AURICH,
Of Counsel.

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[48]Petition and Brief, pp. 20 to 24.
[49]Petition and Brief, cut opposite p. 16.
[50]Petition and Brief, pp. 14, 25 and 26.



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CHARLES ELMORE CROPLEY
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

No. 377

RONNING MACHINERY COMPANY and
THE GALION IRON WORKS AND
MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Petitioners and Appellants Below,

vs.

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.,
Respondent and Appellee Below.

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners, by way of reply to Respondent's brief, respectfully submit the following:

The record shows that during the twelve years that Winsor's application was pending in the Patent Office it was involved for approximately seven years in two protracted interferences (Interference No. 51,565 with

the party Myers was declared on Oct. 16, 1924 R. 1377-8, final court decision was dated Nov. 23, 1927, R. 1374, Winsor winning; Interference No. 60,337 was declared on Sept. 17, 1930 with Ronning et al., R. 1452-5, final court decision was dated May 15, 1935, R. 1451, Winsor winning). Winsor's **urgent request** for early issuance of his patent was denied by the Patent Office. As early as July 14, 1924 (R. 1362-63) Winsor stated "It is earnestly urged and respectfully hoped, that this case can now be passed to allowance".

Respondent's assertion that "**most** of the claims sued on herein were inserted in the application" (Respondent's brief p. 4) in July and September of 1935 is apt to be very misleading. Claims **2 to 10** here in suit were added to the Winsor application on July 27, 1929 (R. 1415) **before** Caterpillar **started** designing its infringing devices. In fact, these claims 2 to 10 of Winsor were copied from Ronning patent No. 1,706,256 under which Caterpillar was a licensee from August 1, 1930 until March 1, 1936, paying royalties in excess of $75,000.00 part of which was on the **identical machines** here involved. This license was cancelled by a letter written by its Vice-President, Oscar L. Starr, and dictated by its attorney, Charles M. Fryer (R. 605), in which Caterpillar stated: "In view of the recent issuance of the Winsor patent No. 2,020,271 containing claims under which we formerly paid royalty to you, — etc." we hereby elect to cancel the license agreement. (Paragraph XXII of the Complaint, R. 19-20, and Answer, R. 36-7; Pls' Exh. No. H.-613, R. 1689-93; Pls' Interrogatories Paragraphs XIV and XV, Pls' Exh. 610, R. 1679; and Def. Answers, Pls' Exh. 612, R. 1696).

Another important fact in connection with the case of *Galion* v. *Beckwith,* 25 Fed. Supp. 73; on appeal 105 Fed. (2d) 941, not mentioned by Respondent, was that these claims 2 to 10 of Winsor were **not** involved, and when Galion sought to have them included by amending its bill of particulars Caterpillar asserted "Winsor's claims two to ten in effect new and different cause of action requiring different preparation and defense from those applying to claims specified in bill of particulars now standing in case —" (Pls' Exhs. 520 and 536, R. 1273-4; 1526-7) so Galion withdrew its motion to prevent postponement of the trial of the case (R. 1128-30).

It is therefore clear that there **are not** uniform decisions in two circuits on claims 2 to 10 of Winsor. In fact, a reading of the decisions in the cases of *Galion* v. *Beckwith,* 25 Fed. Supp. 73 and 105 F. (2d) 941 shows clearly that they were **founded largely** on the fact that all the claims **there involved** were added to Winsor's application in 1935. In Judge Schoonmaker's decision (25 Fed. Supp. 73) he comments on this fact in the opening statement and again on page 74 and it is the **very foundation** of his ruling of no infringement.

Petitioners again invite attention to the fact that Respondent has not attempted to point out **any** limitation in **any** claim which it asserts finds no response in its machines. Furthermore, Respondent makes no attempt to harmonize the **clear conflict** of the decisions in this case and those in the two *Galion* v. *Adams* cases, 105 Fed. (2d) 943 and 128 Fed. (2nd) 411, involving the **same patent** and many of the **same claims,** including claims 2 to 10 **not involved** in the *Galion* v. *Beckwith* suit, 25 Fed. Supp. 73 and 105 Fed. (2d) 941.

Respondent's statement at the top of page 16 of its brief that point G is urged for the first time is inaccurate. It was repeatedly urged below both in written and oral argument. Nothing need be added to the merits of Petitioners' argument on this point over that contained in the original brief on the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

HARKER H. HITTSON,
Counsel for Petitioners.

October 7, 1942.